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Abstract 
 
During the past decade scholars have attempted to identify factors influence conflict onset, 
outcome and duration by using cross-national quantitative analysis, many of which utilize 
terrain roughness as a control variable or as an independent variable asserting that it provides 
an advantage in guerrilla warfare. However, despite the theoretical assumptions, these studies 
fail to reach consensus regarding how or if rough terrain contributes to conflict. One study in 
particular, Buhaug and Lujala (2005), found that higher levels of rough terrain in the conflict 
zone were associated, albeit insignificantly, with shorter conflicts, while higher levels of 
terrain roughness at the country level were associated with longer conflicts. This thesis seeks 
to explain this counterintuitive result by proposing a new theory about how terrain roughness 
impacts the way counterinsurgencies are fought. I argue that terrain roughness which conflict 
zones geographically separated from the capital experience higher levels of indiscriminate 
violence from the state which increases rebel resolve and prolongs the conflict. Using GIS 
analysis to construct terrain roughness measures of the country-level, conflict-zone-level and 
the area separating the conflict zone from the capital. This hypothesis, in two parts, was 
tested using Cox Proportional-hazards modeling to determine if increased terrain roughness 
in the area separating the conflict zone from the capital results in longer conflicts. The second 
part was tested using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis to learn whether or not 
increased terrain roughness in the separation zone increases the number of casualties. I also 
use Coarsened Exact Matching to limit selection issues related to state power, conflict 
location, and the ability to inflict a large number of casualties. The results from these test do 
not provide direct support for the hypothesis. Rough terrain and spatial separation between 
the conflict zone and the capital correlates to both shorter conflicts and fewer casualties. 
However, several of the underlying assumptions of the theory do receive strong support, 
including the relationship between state power and conflict location, cost sensitivity, and the 
application of indiscriminate violence in areas away from the capital. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 The notion that rough terrain provides an advantage in guerrilla warfare has become 
axiomatic in discussions of civil war and insurgency. While scholars rely on the presence of 
rough terrain to predict conflict onset or explain conflict duration, the results in quantitative 
studies fail to offer consensus on the value of these variables. Often they fail to control for 
battle field dynamics. Pooling data of conflicts where insurgency is the primary tactic with 
wars fought conventionally may account for why terrain roughness reaches statistical 
significance in some large-n studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, DeRouen and Sobek 2004, 
Fearon and Laitin 2003) and not others (Collier et al. 2008, Buhaug and Lujala 2005, Buhaug 
et al. 2009). Although it may be advantageous in guerrilla warfare, rough terrain may have 
adverse affects when states use conventional tactics. 
 Another potential explanation for the lack of consensus among large-n quantitative 
studies of civil war is the use of poor proxies for terrain roughness. While Lyall and Wilson 
III (2009) limit their case selection to wars in which the guerrilla warfare was the primary 
battlefield dynamic thus compiling a dataset in which the advantage of terrain roughness 
should be most apparent, their proxy for terrain roughness, an average of five measures of 
altitude from within the conflict zone, fails to reach significance for either period of their 
analysis.   
 Buhaug et al. (2005, 2009) seek to demonstrate the problems with country-level 
analysis for variable such as terrain roughness in examinations of intrastate conflicts, use GIS 
data to create measures of both country-level and conflict-zone-level terrain roughness. 
Interestingly, their results suggest that a higher terrain roughness level shortens conflict 
duration when measured where the conflict is fought (though failing to reach statistical 
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significance), but lengthens conflict when measured at the country level. While intending to 
illustrate the value of sub-national variables in civil war, they arrive at a counterintuitive 
result. Others have emphasized the importance of rural bases for the feasibility of rebellion 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This may help explain the contradiction 
of Buhaug's empirical analysis from his theoretical framework if the rebel's rural base were 
in the mountains but the fighting itself took place in another location.   
 However, these perplexing results may have other implications. Rather than 
exclusively offering refuge to insurgency forces engaged in guerrilla warfare, terrain creates 
a barrier of separation between the state and  rural constituency which gives the state a 
greater propensity to apply indiscriminant violence, which in turn increases rebel resolve and 
conflict duration. It does so in two ways: (1) when the fighting occurs in remote regions 
where the state has less developed infrastructure and fewer social and economic connections, 
it will have greater difficulty identifying insurgents, and  (2) with a lower cost absorption, in 
terms of casualties, states will employ indiscriminant violence because of its lower monetary 
cost.     
 Outnumbering conventional wars by nearly three to one (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 
2000), lasting on average ten times longer (Collier, et al. 2008),
1
 and with five times the 
number of deaths (Fearon and Laitin 2003), civil wars have, unsurprisingly, received an 
increasing amount of attention from scholars. However, disaggregation of data, such as by 
war type or rebel objective often provides better illustrations of how specific variables affect 
conflict. Lyall and Wilson III examine specifically insurgency wars, defined by "a strategy of 
armed resistance that (1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent 
through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win 
                                                          
1
 This is an increase from Collier, et al. 2004a in which they suggest civil wars were six times longer.   
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the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population" (70). They argue that 
because a key element of counterinsurgency campaigns is the ability for the incumbent to 
distinguish between insurgent and non-combatant when applying violence, mechanization 
and a reduced dependence on the local population for supplies will lead to "identification 
problems." While their results fail to support the notion that  terrain roughness contributes to 
incumbent defeats, rough terrain and distance are the sorts of obstacles mechanized forces 
were developed to overcome. Similarly, some have argued the development of military and 
communications technologies have reduced the relevance of distance and separation 
variables (Boulding 1960, Scott 2009). However, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that the 
reliance on these technologies results in a greater level of indiscriminant violence, while the 
geographic conditions which led states to depend on them is not also associate with 
indiscriminant violence. Examining the variables that lead states to apply indiscriminate 
violence in war may allow international organizations and third party states with 
humanitarian interests to identify and prevent occurrences of mass killings and unnecessary 
civilian casualties. Because the use of indiscriminate violence by one party may increase 
support for the opposing party (Kalyvas 2006), indiscriminate violence may lead to longer 
conflicts, which in addition to casualties will have higher material and economic costs as 
well.   
 In addition to explaining the counterintuitive results in Buhaug et al (2005; 2009) and 
the lack of consensus regarding the role of terrain roughness in intrastate conflicts, this study 
seeks to examine the relationship between states and their constituencies and how that 
relationship differs when that constituency is separated from the state geographically. To do 
so, I employ Cox Proportional-hazards Modeling to examine how terrain roughness as well 
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as other measures controlling for different types of separation between the state and 
constituency affects conflict duration. Because of the potential for duration to influence the 
levels of violence and, concurrently, the level of violence to influence the will of both the 
incumbent and the rebels, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis to analyze the 
relationship between terrain roughness and casualties. Interestingly, the state strength, which 
allows states to control territory and fight conflicts effectively also impacts the location of 
conflicts. To address this selection problem, I use Coarsened Exact Matching to prune the 
dataset of outliers that might bias the result. To further understand the relationship between 
physical separation of the conflict zone from the capital, I run separate SUR analyses on each 
type of conflict to help determine if the nature of the conflict fought in remote regions truly 
differs from those in which some of the fighting takes place in the capital. 
 I find while many of the underlying assumptions are supported, rough terrain in the 
conflict zone and the areas separated the capital from the conflict zone is associated with 
shorter conflict, and in the case of the latter, fewer casualties. However, there is evidence to 
support that terrain roughness does influence how conflicts are fought, in terms of number of 
casualties, as well as a difference in nature between conflicts fought in proximity to the 
capital and those fought in remote regions. 
 The next chapter will examine the existing literature regarding the role of terrain 
roughness in conflict, the use of indiscriminate violence, and the cost sensitivity of states, 
rebels and non-combatants in terms of casualties. Chapter Three will outline the theory I 
propose regarding the role of terrain roughness in leading the incumbent to employ 
indiscriminate violence, leading to longer conflicts. The fourth chapter will discuss the 
methodology I use to test the effects of separation on both conflict duration and casualties, 
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and control for selection issues. Chapter Five will describe the case selection criteria and 
data. The test results will be presented and explained in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven will 
describe the limitations of the study in terms of both the available data and the methodology, 
explain the results in terms of their relationship to the core hypotheses, the proposed  theory 
and the relevance to existing literature within Political Science, as well as discuss avenues for 
further research. The final chapter will offer concluding remarks. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 Prior studies of conflict have tested terrain roughness as an explanatory variable, 
assuming its importance with respect to guerrilla warfare without disaggregating based on 
battlefield dynamic. Despite the overwhelming theoretical importance, empirical studies find 
mixed results due to case selection issues and use of poor proxies for terrain roughness. 
While some studies discuss guerrilla warfare specifically, their emphasis on identity 
problems and the indiscriminate use of force provide further support to the idea that rough 
terrain, as a spatial barrier between the state and rural constituency, may influence the 
duration of counterinsurgency campaigns. Past studies have examined duration as a 
dependent variable, but often with other motives. Those studies that do explore the effects of 
terrain roughness often attempt to apply the theory to cases in which guerrilla warfare is not 
the primary battlefield dynamic or use inappropriate proxies. This review will demonstrate a 
gap in existing literature and identify the theoretical underpinnings for the role of terrain in 
exacerbating identity problems and increasing the resolve of the warring parties.   
1. The role of terrain 
 While many scholars test the effects of rough terrain as a contributor to conflict onset, 
duration or outcomes with varying results, the theoretical underpinnings as well as its 
consistent use as a control variable suggest it has some influence. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that rough terrain provides refuge to fighters engaging in guerrilla warfare. 
However, studies often fail to differentiate between wars fought using guerrilla tactics and 
wars fought conventionally with a clearly defined front-line in which refuge, such as rough 
terrain, provides no advantage. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
suggest mountainous terrain contributes significantly to civil war onset. However, after 
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adjusting their model, Collier and Hoeffler (2008) find geographic variables fail to reach 
statistical significance in predicting onset. Each study restricts itself to civil wars while 
pooling conflicts of different battle field dynamics. Such pooling is unsurprising given that a 
post-World War II conflict rarely consisted of a single battlefield dynamic in its entirety. 
However, the theoretical underpinning of the value of terrain roughness in a) creating 
opportunity for civil war onset by making conflict feasible for weaker parties in the face of 
stronger adversaries, b) prolonging conflict by allowing rebels to hide, c) increasing the 
likelihood of incumbent defeats by providing guerrillas with an advantage does not hold as 
equally valid for wars fought primarily with conventional tactics.   
 Other studies, when restricted to insurgencies, defined as war in which guerrilla 
warfare is the primary tactic, counterintuitively find that terrain roughness fails to achieve 
significance.  Lyall and Wilson III (2009), when testing the effects of mechanization on the 
outcome of counterinsurgency campaigns, find that both terrain roughness and distance of 
the conflict zone from the capital were not significant predictors of rebel victory in the 
mechanized era (post-1918). However, in pooling interstate and intrastate conflicts based on 
battlefield dynamic the dataset includes cases in which the distances variable represents the 
separation of the colonial or foreign capital from the conflict zone. As a result, anti-colonial 
and interstate conflicts dwarf the variation in the distance variable among intrastate civil 
wars. Their variable for terrain roughness, measured by taking the average of altitude 
measurements from the corners and center of the conflict zone, failed to reach statistical 
significance. This poorly approximates terrain "roughness" since a high plateau may be 
relatively flat and thus fail to provide refuge for rebels engaged in guerrilla warfare. Johnston 
and Urlacher (2010) have similar findings in their study of counterinsurgency duration with a 
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similar case-selection criteria and identical variables for geography. Geographic and distance 
variables failed to reach significance in either the pre- or post-mechanized era, though they 
were more salient in pre-mechanized era (14). Their variables suffer the same flaws as Lyall 
and Wilson III's study. However, using Lyall and Wilson III's case selection and terrain 
roughness measure, Schutte (2012) finds elevation and forest cover weak predictors of higher 
casualties with the latter being highly significant. This coincides with DeRouen and Sobek's 
finding that mountainous terrain increases the probability of rebel victory while the 
probability decreases with flat terrain.   
 Other examinations of the role of terrain in conflict explore its effects on duration but 
do so with civil wars without respect to battlefield dynamic (pooling insurgencies with wars 
fought conventionally). Collier et al. (2004) find that neither mountains nor forest cover were 
significant predictors of duration using terrain data which measures the percentage of 
mountain and forest cover of the country. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) and Buhaug et al. 
(2009) have the opposite finding for mountain and forest cover for country-level measures. 
However, their examination of mountain-cover within the area where the fighting occurred 
correlates to shorter conflicts, though failing to reach statistical significance. Similarly, 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) when examining outcome and duration found that forest cover 
and mountainous terrain increased conflict duration. Despite the varied outcomes, most of 
these studies examined terrain roughness and applied the theoretical advantages of guerrilla 
warfare to wars fought using conventional tactics by examining exclusively civil wars. These 
results might be tied to case selection rather than an indicator of the effects of terrain 
roughness. Lyall (2010) when examining the duration of counterinsurgency campaigns, 
found neither distance nor altitude significantly associated with conflict duration. 
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 Beyond terrain roughness, distance also contributes to conflict onset, duration, and 
outcome. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) that find the distance between the conflict zone and 
capital significantly increases the duration, while Weidmann (2009) found it significantly 
associated with conflict onset. Conversely, Johnston and Urlacher (2012 unpublished) test a 
similar variable in a study of counterinsurgency campaigns and find distance fails to reach 
statistical significance. However, in Johnston and Urlacher's study, the variance among 
intrastate wars was dwarfed by the presence of anti-colonial wars and wars of foreign 
interventions where the distance between the incumbent's capital and conflict zone was often 
several thousand miles. Lyall and Wilson III (2009) and Schutte (2010) have similar findings 
when applying the same variable to insurgency outcomes when pooling intrastate and 
extrastate conflicts. 
 Although scholars routinely assert the importance of rough terrain and other factors of 
geographic differentiation, empirical evidence offers a mixed assessment potentially due to 
case selection which ignores the underlying assumptions or masks the effects through high 
levels of variance, or due to poor proxies for terrain roughness.   
2. Insurgency and battlefield dynamics  
 The significance of terrain roughness as a variable in conflict rests on the notion that 
it provides an advantage in guerrilla warfare. Mao explains the tactic of guerrilla warfare, "In 
guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the 
west; avoid the solid, attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. 
When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him 
when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla 
strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he 
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must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated" (1937, 7). In other words, 
employing this strategy of attacking an enemy and retreating before the enemy has a chance 
to retaliate allows one opponent to exhaust the will of another. He further discusses the 
importance of refuge for the guerrillas offered by terrain or a large non-combatant population 
with which to blend in. These elements which provide cover to insurgents make the attack-
and-retreat method of guerrilla warfare more feasible. 
 While several scholars draw on the importance of this battlefield dynamic with 
respect to the costs and outcomes, such considerations are rarely made in quantitative studies 
of civil war.  Most notably, Mack (1975) asserted that utilizing guerrilla warfare tactics, 
small powers can exhaust the will of their opponent whose cost sensitivity may outweigh 
their interests in continuing to fight. He suggests that through this strategy smaller powers 
whose survival depends on success can defeat larger powers based on what he describes as 
"interest asymmetry" in which the larger power will be only minimally harmed by the defeat 
and therefore less willing to continue a prolonged conflict. Interjecting in this discussion, 
Arreguin-Toft (2001, 2005) suggests the ability of weaker powers to defeat stronger powers 
rests on a choice of strategies by each actor. Engaging in guerrilla warfare strategies while a 
stronger opponent attempts to engage in conventional tactics allows a weaker power to gain 
an advantage (and subsequent victory). However, engaging in barbarism, which Arreguin-
Toft describes as the application of indiscriminate violence against civilians, when the rebels 
utilize guerrilla warfare tactics will allow for the successful defeat of the rebels. The problem 
with Arreguin-Toft's theory is that it relies upon the assumption that the stronger actor is 
necessarily fighting a war of aggression (in which it selects its strategy first) against the 
weaker actor. While this may be true of the cases examined in Arreguin-Toft's (2005) study, 
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such underlying assumptions become problematic when applied to cases of rebellion. 
Furthermore, in the context of a rise in rebel victories over time, his theory would suggests 
that incumbents have become increasingly poor decisions makers over time. 
 Lyall and Wilson III (2009), also seeking to explain the rise in incumbent defeats, 
argue that battlefield dynamic cannot be predicted ex ante (81), and for this reason 
mechanization, measured by the ratio of troops to vehicles, provides a better predictor of 
outcomes. They suggest powerful states with standing armies are better equipped to fight 
against other armies in conventional battles (78). Advancements in technology better allowed 
armies to fight conventional wars in remote regions by allowing them to operate farther from 
the source of their supplies without having to rely on potentially hostile local sources.   
 Unlike many other studies they restrict their selection to cases which utilize guerrilla 
warfare as the predominate battlefield dynamic. They illustrate how mechanized forces 
equipped to fight conventional wars struggle to overcome guerrilla warfare strategy from 
weaker forces due to "information starvation," or the inability to distinguish insurgents from 
the non-combatant population. 
3. The role of identification, control, and spatial separation  
 Because the success of guerrilla warfare rests on the ability to retreat before the 
opposing party can retaliate, a successful counterinsurgency requires distinguishing the 
insurgents from the noncombatant population. Returning to Mao's discussion of guerrilla 
warfare, his description of the rebels' goals of winning the allegiance of noncombatant 
population while hiding from retaliation from the opponent lay the ground for many 
contemporary discussions of insurgency. Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates that these objectives 
of hiding from state retaliation and winning the allegiance of the population are closely tied. 
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The noncombatant population has the power to either protect or denounce the rebels to the 
incumbent. Their penchant for denunciation relates closely to whichever group can best 
provide protection (118). For this reason, Kalyvas argues, indiscriminate violence is 
counterproductive in COIN campaigns. When then incumbent administers indiscriminate 
violence, the noncombatants will aid the rebels, either materially, through not denouncing 
them to the incumbent, or through participation. Conversely, selective violence allows 
incumbents to eliminate insurgency forces without making the noncombatant population feel 
they are at risk of violence and reducing their incentive to collaborate with the rebels.   
 Lyall and Wilson (2009) define insurgency, in part, by the goal of winning the 
support of some portion of the non-combatant population (70). They attribute the diminishing 
ability for states to win this support (and decreasing ability to achieve victory in COIN 
campaigns) to "mechanization" or the dependence of the counterinsurgency forces on the 
supply line.  Subsequently, states have experienced lower levels of interaction with the local 
populations as technology increased and they became less dependent on "foraging" for 
supplies in conflict zones. This dynamic exacerbates "identity problems" counterinsurgency 
forces face in distinguishing the non-combatant population, whose allegiance they seek, from 
the insurgents whom they seek to defeat. One obvious goal of technological advancement 
was to make obstacles such as distance, rough terrain and other geographic factors less 
salient. However, following Lyall and Wilson's (2009) logic that the ability to operate 
independent of the local population in remote regions diminishes the ability to effective fight 
COIN wars, this strategy may have effectively backfired. 
 Kalyvas (2006) argues that in civil war, either side is more likely to use 
indiscriminate violence in areas in which they do not control or in which they have less 
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control relative to their opponent (223). Administering selective violence requires 
information which can be obtained more easily when in control of the territory in question. 
The non-combatant population is more likely to lend their allegiance to whichever side can 
best provide them with security or protection from violence (117). Having said allegiance 
from the population makes the controlling party less inclined to administer indiscriminate 
violence since this may induce collaboration with their rival who may be capable of shielding 
the non-combatants from the seemingly random violence.  Conversely, the controlling parties 
use of selective violence to ensure the noncombatant populations in the territories they 
control do not defect.   
 Using Lyall and Wilson's (2009) dataset Schutte (2012) examines the effects of 
geography on casualties and outcomes finds that mechanization is associated with higher 
levels of casualties. This supports Lyall and Wilson's hypothesis that troops tied to "the 
umbilical cord of the supply line" (75) will apply force with less discrimination. The 
strongest and most significant indicator of both rebel victory and high casualties was a 
"territorial balance indicator" which measured the dispersion level of the population from the 
capital. In other words a greater percentage of the population living away from the capital 
increases both the level of violence and probability of incumbent defeat. Weidmann (2009) 
finds groups residing in mountainous areas are more likely to engage in rebellions against the 
state. 
 Others suggest geography influences conflict by ascribing loyalty to a geographic 
region. Toft (2005) describes an increased resolve based on loyalty to a specific territory as a 
homeland, particularly if parties have fought to preserve the land from foreign invasion. 
Buhuag (2006) suggests that stronger states are more likely to be subject to secessionist 
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conflicts rather than conflicts with revolutionary aims (705). Similarly, Mason and Fett 
(1996) explain that the indivisible nature of territory makes civil wars more difficult to end 
and as a results, territorial based conflicts are more likely to end in settlement, rather than 
victory. This is consistent with Balch-Lindsay and Enterline's (2000) finding that separatist 
conflicts are more highly resolute and last longer. Fearon claims that longer conflicts 
necessarily occur in remote regions of states where ethnic minorities have been displaced and 
marginalized in his "sons of the soil" argument (2004). Scott (2009) makes a similar point, 
suggesting that groups evading the state by taking up residence in mountainous regions 
develop distinctly different identities and ethnicities from the urban and lowland based 
populations the state claims to represent. These studies demonstrate the value of territory and 
a geographically based kinship that can affect the resolve of warring parties and thus increase 
the duration. This supports Weidmann's finding that mountain-based groups are more likely 
to engage the state in rebellion.  
 DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find that military strength does not correlate to 
government victories. "In civil wars, a large army capacity may act as a detriment in that its 
use incurs more grievance against the government" (314). Though military strength does not 
necessarily correspond to mechanization, their results lead to a conclusion similar to that of 
Lyall and Wilson III (2009). The dependence of these forces on supply lines and military 
transport inhibited their ability to establish relationships with the local population in 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Subsequently, insurgents, defined as those employing 
guerrilla warfare tactics, benefit from the force's inability to distinguish rebels from those in 
the general population. These incumbent forces are also more likely to employ indiscriminate 
violence as a measure of counterinsurgency which can increase support for the rebels from 
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the noncombatant population. While these factors hinder incumbent abilities to effectively 
fight counterinsurgency wars, these factors become much more problematic in conflicts that 
occur in areas further from the incumbent's reach.. 
4. The Significance of Duration and Cost Sensitivity  
 Examining outcomes or onset exclusively ignores the true costs of war, in terms of 
both monetary costs and casualties. Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare emphasize 
exhausting the will of one's opponent. "While these units function as guerrillas, they may be 
compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting giant a giant both in front and in rear, 
ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and 
hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find their victim is 
not only exhausted but practically perishing" (1937, 14). In addition to an assessment of the 
cost, duration also measures the level of resolve of the fighting parties. Mack (1975) and 
Merom (2003) both emphasize the impact of duration in weakening the resolve of stronger 
parties who might not necessary face existential threats from defeat.   
 DeRouen and Sobek (2004) similarly suggest the length of a conflict measures the 
resolve of each party and that both the incumbent and the rebels make decisions based on the 
likelihood of victory and how long each expects the conflict to continue. Furthermore, they 
find duration correlates to the likelihood of certain types of outcomes. For example, if rebels 
can survive the first several months of conflict their chance of victory increases, though 
remains relatively low (316). Similarly, incumbent victories are most likely close to the onset 
of conflict but diminishes over time in favor of settlements or treaties, or in other words, 
"rebels appear to be the beneficiaries of prolonged war" (316). 
 Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004) suggest rebels will continue fighting as long 
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as funding and cover are available, or, in other words, as long as conflict is feasible. In this 
regard, rebels may have a vested interest in prolonging the war. However, the interests of the 
incumbent and rebels are not the only considerations for whether a conflict continues.  
 The importance of winning the support of the non-combatant population in guerrilla 
warfare provides a certain level of veto power to the populace. Though it is not his primary 
focus, Kalyvas (2006) also discusses the differing reasons for allegiance and involvement 
beyond the political objectives of the civil war. He suggests that non-combatants will go to 
great lengths to avoid violence including "fence-sitting," remaining neutral or attempting to 
curry favor with both groups (245). The historical evidence he uses in developing his theory 
suggests that often non-combatants act strategically to prevent violence. And in some 
instances, the desire for security and stability leads to support for the actor most likely to win 
than that which they agree with ideologically. "Survival and desire for war to end trumps 
ideological allegiances for most people" (117). This illustrates that beyond the will of the 
state and rebels to fight, the non-combatant population has its own cost sensitivity which can 
influence conflict duration. Similarly, Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) illustrate this sort 
of domestic cost sensitivity with the correlation between high casualty levels and the 
likelihood that civil wars will end in a treaty. While they do not specifically address which 
side inflicts the casualties or how, as such variables are difficult to capture in cross-national 
studies, they do illustrate that cost absorption influences an actor's will to continue fighting. 
 For these reasons, duration provides an important variable of interest. Because 
incumbents rarely have a vested interest in prolonging conflict rather than achieving victory, 
understanding the factors that influence insurgents' resolve and prolong fighting capabilities 
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may help induce negotiations rather than protracted conflict. 
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Chapter III: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 While terrain may offer refuge to rebels engaging in guerrilla warfare, it also shapes 
how states project power and influences where and to what extent states maintain control of 
their territory. As a results, rough terrain will also affect how states address rebellion when it 
arises. I argue that spatial separation created by rough terrain influences how conflicts are 
fought by making the incumbent more likely to administer indiscriminate violence due to 
lower cost absorption and limited information, this will in turn increases the rebel's resolve. 
In conflicts located in areas geographically separated from the capital, the state's decision 
makers are less likely to absorb cost or experience the same risks of violence. Similarly, they 
are less likely to have resources that will allow them to identify the insurgents that would 
allow them to employ selective violence. Without the ability to determine who is responsible 
for insurgent attacks and with the ability to administer violence without sharing the risks, 
incumbents will use indiscriminate violence. 
 Despite the overwhelming assumption in existing literature that terrain roughness 
affects intrastate war by offering refuge to fighters engaging in guerrilla warfare, the 
numerous studies that have tested it have failed to reach consensus suggesting that it may 
influence conflict in other ways. In particular, this study seeks to address the counterintuitive 
results in Buhaug et al. (2005, 2009) in which country-level measures of terrain significantly 
increase conflict duration, while the measures of terrain roughness taken in the area where 
fighting occurred does not. While there is little doubt that the ability to conceal themselves 
from counterinsurgency forces is essential to rebels employing guerrilla warfare tactics, they 
can do so in other ways such as in cross-border sanctuaries in neighboring countries or 
among a large non-combatant population. The ability to conceal themselves from 
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counterinsurgency forces allows guerrillas to overcome the power differential when fighting 
against a stronger incumbent force. Without knowing who participated in the insurgent 
attacks, counterinsurgency forces are faced with the dilemma of administering violence 
against non-combatants which may exacerbate discontent and increase sympathy for the 
insurgents. 
 Lyall and Wilson III's (2009) findings on the effects of mechanization suggest that 
states have attempted to overcome the obstacles of distance and rough terrain when exerting 
control in remote regions by relying more heavily on technology rather than developing 
strong local infrastructure. This strategy may have backfired by creating a new problem: 
"information starvation" leading counterinsurgency forces to administer violence 
indiscriminately since they have no local information network to help identify the insurgents. 
In addition to quantitative analysis, Lyall and Wilson III also offer a case study comparison 
of two U.S. forces in Iraq, the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Air Assault Division, in 
2003-2004. While the former relied heavily on mechanization with only a fraction of the 
daily patrols of the 101st, who relied more heavily on "dismounted" patrols that allowed for 
greater levels of interaction with the local population (2009, 96), the 4th Infantry Division 
faced difficulties identifying insurgents with fewer interactions and more limited information 
of the local population (99). Although their findings indicate that distance and terrain 
roughness have become less salient in the mechanized era (Urlacher and Johnston (2011) 
have similar findings for conflict duration), this appears counterintuitive from a theoretical 
standpoint. The technology that allows states to maintain control of remote regions and areas 
with difficult terrain, also limits the interactions and social connections between the urban-
based states and their rural constituency. 
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1. Alternative Explanations 
 While the logic behind Lyall and Wilson III's mechanization theory suggests that how 
battles are fought heavily influences the success of counterinsurgency campaigns and the 
ability of either party to gain the support of the noncombatant population, terrain roughness 
and spatial separation may influence conflicts in other ways.   
a. Increased salience of ethnic identities, via settlement pattern or state-evading 
 Terrain may coincide with settlement patterns of ethnic groups, or in some cases, 
might create more salient ethnic identities due to diminished levels of interaction with other 
groups. This coincides with Scott's (2009) theory that rough terrain and altitude allow groups 
to avoid the state's reach in Southeast Asia. Similarly, he explains other mechanisms of 
spatial separation exacerbate ethnic divisions such as with the Berber nomads in North Africa 
in which nomadism offers similar state-evading refuge (101). The ethnic segregation, either 
by chance in the case of settlement pattern or by choice in the case of evading the state as 
Scott describes, can contribute to conflict by leaving the minority group with limited or no 
representation in the state or by exacerbating deep seated ethnic hatreds. Licklider (1995) 
finds that ethnic/religious-based conflicts are not longer or more intense than political- or 
economic-based conflicts. He suggests that, from a theoretical standpoint, this is 
counterintuitive since these wars provoke deeper levels of commitment they are likely to be 
more intense. However, he does not disaggregate between geographic-based ethnicities and 
conflicts in which conflicting parties live side by side in the same cities and neighborhoods, 
and thus share the risks associated with conflict. 
b. Distribution of resources and representation  
 Similarly, terrain roughness and distance can influence how states distribute resources 
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and benefits among their constituency. In many cases, residence of urban areas have different 
economic interest and social values than those in rural areas. For example, in Afghanistan 
during the late 1970s, the Taraki and Amin governments each attempted to institute land 
reforms in rural areas from urban-based governments of Kabul. However, these 
redistributions of land were not well received by the rural tribal leaders and as a result, under 
these regimes the state failed to project power beyond the capital (Rubin, B., 2002: 122). In 
his examination of the Sendero Luminoso, Weinstein (2006) explains that the heavier 
concentration of state benefits along the coast where the capital is located brought about 
grievance among the inland peasant population. Furthermore, when the economy declined 
and resources became more scarce, the state's provision further diminished for the inland 
residents along with the state's capacity to provide security (Weinstein 2006: 82-83).  
 While two alternative explanations relate to terrain roughness shaping the social and 
political ties between the state and its constituents, I argue that the strategies and means by 
which the state attempts to end a rebellion will vary based on the proximity to the capital. 
The strategies states often adopt in remote regions will facilitate longer, more violent 
conflicts. Because each explanation might increase the duration of conflict by increasing the 
rebels will to fight, examining the level of violence in the conflict allows the final 
explanation to be disaggregated from the exacerbated social and political disconnect.  
2. Causal mechanisms and theory outline:  
 While in reality, the difference between rural conflicts and those fought in proximity 
to the capital is likely informed by each of these three factors, by differentiating an increase 
in resolve from a conflict with limited information from reduced cost absorption from 
increased resolved due to social and political disconnect we can measure the effect terrains 
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influence on how conflicts are fought. To do this I will incorporate the rational choice 
framework developed by Mason and Fett (1996): 
                               
  
    
 
In their framework,       is the party's expected utility of continuing to fight,    is the 
probability of victory,    and    are the utility of victory and defeat respectively.     
  
    
 
is the accumulation of cost if fighting continues, where   is the rate at which the party 
absorbs the cost of the conflict, assumed to be constant, and t is time. It is assumed that for 
both parties that          , where    is the utility of a settlement. Although Mason and 
Fett (1996) seek to explain why some conflicts end in settlement rather than until one party 
has achieved victory, their framework can also be used to compare resolve and cost 
sensitivity in different types of conflicts. 
 If each party in the conflict has Mason and Fett's utility function, a conflict adjacent 
to the capital would have high costs (    
  
    
  for both the incumbent and the rebels. 
However, if the conflict zone is geographically separated from the capital the costs are lower 
for the incumbent, increasing their      , their utility of continuing to fight. The 
incumbent's use of indiscriminate violence also influences the rebels and non-combatant 
population within the conflict zone. As Kalyvas (2006) suggests, because non-combatants 
can do little to ensure they do not become victims of indiscriminate violence, they will 
support the opposing side for the sake of protection. As rebels and non-combatants continue 
to experience indiscriminate violence at the hand of the incumbent, the greater the perceived 
burden of continuing to live under the incumbents rule,    decreases for the rebels. 
Furthermore, because this incumbent strategy leads the noncombatants to support the rebels, 
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it eventually leads to an increase in the probability of rebel victory,   increases for the 
incumbent and   decreases for the rebels. Though the probability of rebel victory is always 
low, a small increase will not only strengthen resolve but also provide incentive for other 
noncombatants to support their cause, increasing conflict duration.  
 H1: Physical separation between the incumbent's decision makers and the conflict zone 
will increase conflict duration   
Conversely, if the incumbent chooses to administer indiscriminate violence in urban areas, 
particularly their own capital, the rate of cost absorption increases substantially. Furthermore, 
if the rebellion takes places in and around the capital, the incumbent is more likely to have an 
information network in place that will allow them to more effectively identify rebels as well 
as a large number of noncombatants with a vested interest in the state's continued stability 
and are thus willing to provide information to the incumbent.  
 H2: Conflicts adjacent to the capital will be less violent than conflicts that occur in 
remote  regions.   
 Armed conflicts of any kind are not as simple as having a single battlefield dynamic 
and are often not limited to a single battlefield.  A conflict may arise from a remote region 
and later spread to the capital, other large cities or the entire country.  When all constituents 
as well as the state decision makers must share the cost of the conflict, they will have a 
greater willingness to bring about an end to the conflict.   
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FIGURE 3.1.   Linking Violence, Rebel Resolve, and Duration by Conflict Type 
   Incumbent    Rebels 
 
 
Separated  - Low cost   Indiscriminate - Increased resolve Increased 
     absorption  Violence - Increased support Duration 
   - Less information     
 
    expansion of conflict zone 
 
 
 Capital-Adjacent  - More information Selective  - variable support  Decreased 
    - High cost   Violence   (depending on   Duration 
      absorption       rebel strategy)     
             
 By re-examining the role of terrain in counterinsurgency campaigns, this project 
seeks to explain the counterintuitive results in Buhaug et al. (2005, 2009) as well as the lack 
of consensus among civil war studies whose results do not support their theoretical 
assumption that it influences wars by providing refuge for insurgents.  Measuring the 
duration of conflicts offers a measure of both rebels' resolve and incumbents' willingness to 
absorb cost, while examining casualty data allows for the disaggregation between battlefield 
dynamics and use of violence and other mechanisms by which terrain roughness might 
influence resolve.  The method by which these variables will be examined will be further 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter IV: Methodology 
1. Matching to compare levels of violence 
 When testing the effects of separation on the levels of violence in counterinsurgency 
campaigns one encounters selection effects when stronger states are more likely to engage in 
conflicts in remote regions (Buhaug 2010) and these states also often possess more effective 
means of administering violence in terms of their military power (Merom 2003). These 
effects are closely related, the same power that allows a state to administer violence 
effectively also allows it to contain the rebellion to specific geographic areas. This 
confounding variable may limit the ability to obtain accurate causal inferences from the 
sample. In other words the treatment, separation between the capital and conflict zone, is 
applied non-randomly. For this reason, non-parametric processing must occur in an attempt 
to achieve near-random or as good as random treatment. 
 By matching, an approach developed by Rubin (1973) as a means of "pruning," the 
dataset of cases which allows for equal distribution of both control and treatment groups in 
terms of confounding variable, X, in this study state strength. Matching treated cases with 
control cases based on X, the confounding pre-treatment variables allows researchers to 
calculate the Average Treatment Effects (ATE).  
          
 
 
     
 
                  
  
 
 
   
 
   
            
Let    indicate a given the casualty level for an observation of conflict, where   (1) the 
dependent variable when treated (in this instance, a conflict separated from the capital) 
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observation and   (0) is the result for the same observation, i , when left untreated. For the 
matching procedure, separation will be transformed into a binary variable, while the 
continuous distance variable will be used during the regression analysis. Because a conflict 
cannot be both treated and untreated, nor can a research perfectly replicate a conflict as in a 
laboratory setting, one measure is left as a counterfactual. A simple comparison of treated to 
control cases risks attributing incorrect causal inference when X influence both the 
application of treatment and the dependent variable. However, pairing cases based on the 
confounding variable or variable(s) X  allows researcher to measure the effects of treatment 
against similar treated and control groups.  
 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) involves coarsening the covariates as much as 
reasonably possible, in other words, cutpoints are identified to assign individual continues 
values to a range. This allows continuous variables to be matched as though they have the 
same value if the values are fall within the range. For example, a researcher may choose to 
coarsen education data into "8th grade or less," "some high school," and "high school 
graduate" with the idea that someone who has completed ninth grade might have more in 
common with someone who has completed eleventh grade than with someone who has 
completed seventh grade. Because there is no a priori reason to believe that an observation 
with, for example, a state power value of .05 would have more in common with an 
observation in which it is .02 than an observation with .08, I use the algorithm in the CEM, 
developed by King et al. 2009. Observations with exact matches on each of the coarsened 
variables, in this case, power, are placed into a single stratum which is then weighted based 
on the number of treated units. If strata do not have at least one treated and one control 
observation then they are pruned from the dataset by setting the weight to zero (King et al. 
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2011, 4). While pruning the dataset by removing observation may seem counterintuitive, 
reducing can, when it removes extreme counterfactuals, increase the efficiency of estimates 
(Ho et al. 2007, 215). Removing these observations that fall outside of the shared "support 
space" in the distributions of the control and treated groups in terms of X allows for obtaining 
causal inference estimates with less sensitivity to assumptions of functional form (211).  
Other approaches to matching include exact matching, Propensity Score Matching and 
Mahalanobis Distance Matching.  Exact matching requires observations be identical on the 
matched covariates.  While this may be feasible when using discretely measure or 
dichotomous variables, continuous data can effectively prune all observations from the 
dataset.  Propensity Score Matching involves summarizing all matching covariates in a single 
measure of the probability that unit i receives treatment, given the covariates   ,       
            then usually estimate with a regression of    on a constant term and    without 
regard to    (Ho et al. 2007, 218).  After calculating the propensity scores, matching using 
methods such as "nearest-neighbor" to match treated and control observations until groups 
with identical propensity score distributions are obtained.  Similarly, Mahalaoanobis 
Distance Matching employs a similar strategy measuring the distance between observations 
   and    with the measure                 
 
           in which   is the sample 
covariance matrix of   (King, et al. 2011, 4, unpublished).  With each of these methods a 
support space, usually based on "calipers" or maximum allowed distance, is established to 
prune outliers that may bias the results. 
 The primary difference between these methods and Coarsened Exact Matching is that 
MDM and PSM chose a fixed number of observations while hoping the method will provide 
an adequate level of balance, while CEM sets a fixed level of imbalance assuming the 
28 
 
remaining number of observations will be sufficiently large (King et al, 2011, 2, 
unpublished).  Because the number of observations in this study, 120, is fairly large, I choose 
to use Coarsened Exact Matching to alleviate the selection issues with separated conflicts 
being fought more frequently in more powerful states since the number of observations 
remaining after matching, without attempting to set ex ante would likely still be sufficiently 
large.   
2. Duration 
 Matching itself does not estimate causal inference, but offers a means of 
preprocessing the data to achieve comparable treatment and control groups. To test the 
influence of spatial separation on conflict duration, I use Cox Proportional-hazards 
Modeling. This method falls under a larger family of statistical approaches commonly 
referred to as event history modeling or survival analysis. The primary advantage of event 
history models is the ability to incorporate right-censored cases, or cases which survive 
beyond the end of the period of interest. Excluding these cases may introduce selection bias 
since these cases may share other characteristics that influence duration (Fearon 2004).  
 This model measures the probability that a hazard, in this case conflict termination, 
will occur given that it has survived until time, t.  
        
    
               
  
 
T is the duration of a conflict. This equation is the rate at which conflict ends within a given 
interval, [t, t +  t]. While, like many researchers, I am interested in conflict termination as a 
continuous hazard rather than a hazard that can occur in discrete intervals, data for 
continuous processes must still be collected at discrete intervals (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997). For this study duration will be measured in weeks. 
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 The Cox Model, developed in 1972, belongs to a larger family of proportional 
hazards models. Proportional Hazards assumption means that a covariate has the same effect 
on duration at any point prior to the conflict terminating. Among various models in event 
history analysis the Cox Proportional-hazards Model, as a semi-parametric model allows the 
researcher to make no assumption about the shape of the hazard function. Because the 
baseline hazard function,      , has no specified functional form it has no intercept, in other 
words the intercept is absorbed into baseline hazard function (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 
2004, 49).  
                          +...+     )      
    
     
     
                        
Previous literature is fairly split with respect to model specification between Proportional 
Hazard Models (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Collier 2004; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; 
Urlacher and Johnston 2011) and Weibull Models (Buhaug et al. 2005, 2009, Lyall 2010), 
with the former being particularly popular among scholars who wish to test time-varying 
covariates. Selecting Weibull regression for survival analysis requires the researcher to make 
assumptions about the shape of the hazard model, specifically monotonicity. In other words, 
the hazard rate must either increase or decrease exclusively over time. With a Cox model, the 
researcher allows for the possibility that the hazard rate, or probability of the conflict will 
terminate, may decrease and increase over time. DeRouen and Sobek's (2004) findings 
suggest this may be true of the hazard rate for intrastate wars, when they find that wars 
surviving the first few months when incumbent victory is most likely are likely to continue 
(316). Similarly, to follow Mason and Fett's (1996) logic, both incumbents and rebels choose 
to continue fighting based on their own perceptions of how long the fighting will continue 
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and their perceived likelihood of success (549). If after several months, the fighting continues 
without a clear winner or resolution, more time may elapse before the incumbent or rebels 
have adjusted their expectations about the future cost and likelihood of victory, during which 
time the likelihood of conflict termination may decreases but later increase when incumbent's 
and rebel's expectations have been adjusted. Others (Lyall 2010, Buhaug 2009) suggest that 
the probability of conflict increases over time. While I do not explicitly seek to make claims 
about the shape of the hazard function, it is worth noting that there is sufficient reason to 
suspect it may be non-monotonic.  
 One potential disadvantage of the Cox model is that if the hazard function does take a 
known functional form, such as the Weibull distribution for conflict duration if the 
assumptionsof Lyall 2010 and Buhaug 2009 are correct, the Cox model will be less efficient. 
If the standard errors for a Weibull model are smaller, the efficiency would justify using it 
over the Cox model. However, if the standard errors are similar between the two models, the 
Cox model would be preferred because less restrictive assumptions (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997). 
3. Casualty analysis  
 Because of the potential for duration and casualties to influence one another, I employ 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis. First developed by Zellner (1962), this method 
follows the same notion as with serial autocorrelation for a single equation in which the error 
terms are correlated. As the name implies the two equations may not appear to be related, but 
a relationships might emerge. If the two error terms are uncorrelated, the procedure will yield 
the same results as if they were estimated separately through Ordinary Least Squares 
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regression, if they are related, using a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regression will 
provide a more efficient estimation. 
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Chapter V: Case Selection and Data 
1. Research Scope  
 Testing the effects spatial separation on the duration of insurgency wars, I have 
chosen to limit the study to conflicts started between 1945 and 2005 in which guerrilla 
warfare was the primary battlefield dynamic. Lyall and Wilson III's (2009) dataset provides a 
comprehensive list of insurgency wars fought between 1800 and 2005. However, unlike their 
study which seeks to illustrate the differences in outcomes in the pre- versus the post-
mechanized era, limiting the study to conflicts fought after WWII removes the influence of 
conflict norms which most scholars believe to be different prior to WWII (Merom 2003, 
Fearon and Laitin 2003). Restricting the case selection to insurgencies provides a better 
indicator of whether terrain within the conflict zone functions as an area of refuge for 
guerrillas while excluding any countervailing may have on conventional wars. For this study, 
I define insurgency as Lyall and Wilson III do, as "protracted violent struggle by non-state 
actors to obtain their political objectives - often independence, greater autonomy, or 
subversion of existing authorities - against the current political authority (the incumbent)" 
(70). They further distinguish their case selection by requiring the conflicts have a minimum 
of 1,000 battle deaths with at least 100 on each side, and the non-state actor utilize guerrilla 
warfare strategy. The define guerrilla warfare as "a strategy of armed resistance that (1) uses 
small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes 
while avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some 
portion of the noncombatant population" (70).  
 Because the theoretical claims apply to cases in which states administer violence 
against their own constituency, I further restrict the case selection to exclude anti-colonial 
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wars, and cases of foreign intervention in which the intervening incumbent is non-contiguous 
to the state in which they intervene. I distinguish anti-colonial wars from separatist conflicts 
not by outcome (particularly since right-censored cases do not yet have outcomes) but by 
certain characteristics. Colonization typically involves less social and political integration of 
the colony to the homeland. Conversely, a separatist war involves residents of a state's home 
territory who share similar levels of representation as those in other areas of the state's 
territory. Similarly, I chose to include wars of conquest and irredentism in which the territory 
in question is contiguous to the incumbent state. Failing to include such cases would exclude 
the conflicts between North and South Yemen that eventually led to a unified state. As 
Fearon (2004) explains, case selection based on outcome can potentially lead to selection 
bias, for this reason I include cases in which one contiguous state attempts to acquire territory 
of another. 
 Finally, because the theory rests on an incumbent's willingness to apply violence 
against its constituency and the incumbent's own cost sensitivity, I also exclude cases where 
a third party contributed directly to the violence through intervention on behalf of either 
party. This should not be confused with other types of support such as providing incumbents 
or rebels with weapons, financial support or refuge in which the receiving party still decides 
how to administer violence. For example, while the Vietnam War, as fought between North 
and South Vietnam is included in Lyall and Wilson III's (2009) dataset (with the United 
States intervention conflict coded separately though they overlap), I have chosen to exclude it 
since the United States, as non-contiguous foreign power, intervened and administered 
violence against people who do not fall within its constituency, scholars have suggested the 
willingness of states to apply violence against foreign populations differs considerably from 
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the manner in which they would apply violence domestically (Meron 2003). 
2. Independent Variable: Spatial Separation/Terrain Roughness Measures 
 To measure terrain roughness, I used ArcGIS 10.1 and data created by the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP 2002) which divides the land area into 10 by 10 kilometer 
cells with each mountainous cell assigned a value 1-7 based on the difference between 
highest and lowest point within that cell. Unlike altitude-based measures of roughness, this 
data provides a more effective means of distinguishing rough low-lying areas or higher flat 
plateaus which would otherwise be unaccounted for in the data. Up to four measures of 
terrain roughness were taken for each conflict. The first, Country-level Roughness is an 
average of the values of all cells within the territory, cells without a UNEP value are given a 
value of zero. Additional GIS analysis was performed to create a polygon file for each 
conflict zone from the Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) which provides the 
coordinates of a center point and radius for each conflict. The centerpoint was plotted and a 
the radius was used to create a circular buffer which was then clipped to the borders of the 
territory (the state boundaries or outer boundaries of two or more contiguous states involved 
in the conflict) to provide a measurable area for the conflict zone. To measure Conflict Zone 
Roughness, an average of the values of all cells within the conflict zone was taken. If cells 
did not have a UNEP value, they were given a value of zero.  
 To provide a measure of Separation Zone Roughness, the roughness for the area 
between the capital and the conflict zone in which conflict, in which some of the fighting 
takes place in the capital can be given a meaningful value, each of the UNEP values for 
terrain roughness has been weighted. Cells with the UNEP value of 1 were given a weight of 
.7, with the weight of each successive value increasing by .1. Cells with no value were given 
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a weight of .5. Tangent lines are drawn from each side of the circular conflict zone to the 
capital (plotted from CIA World Factbook Coordinates) to capture the area the incumbent 
would need to cross to reach the conflict zone from the capital. Within this field the weighted 
values are summed. Conflicts in which some or all the fighting took place in the capital were 
given a value of 1. These values are logged.  In observations in which the conflict took place 
in one or more contiguous states  
 To provide an alternative measure of separation, Separation Zone Roughness 
(Alternate), similar to the first two measures of terrain roughness, the average of the UNEP 
values was taken for the area separating the capital from the conflict zone. However, this 
value does not incorporate distance and thus, does not differentiate between a conflict zone 
separated by hundreds of kilometers of mountainous terrain and one separated by shorter 
distance of equally mountainous terrain. It is included only as an alternative.  
 As an additional measure of separation, Distance was also included as the distance in 
logged kilometers between the capital and the conflict zone. In cases where the conflict took 
place in one or more contiguous states, the capital of the incumbent (as defined by Lyall, the 
"counterinsurgency force") was used for this measure.   
 A dichotomous variable, Separation, was added, taking the value of 1 if the conflict 
zone was a measurable distance from the capital and 0 if the conflict was fought in an area 
adjacent to the capital.  This variable was used in the Coursened Exact Matching process as 
the "treatment" which I argue is applied non-randomly with a bias toward more powerful 
states. 
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FIGURE 5.1. Conflict and Separation Zones of Pakistan v. Baluchistan, 1973-1977 
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FIGURE 5.2.   Conflict and Separation Zones of Sindhis v. Mohajirs, 1993-1999
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3. Dependent variables 
 Because Cox Proportional-hazards model requires discrete intervals rather a 
continuous measure of time, conflicts were measured in a rounded number of Weeks based 
on the start and end dates in Lyall and Wilson III (2009).   
 The measure of casualties, Average Battle Deaths per Year includes both military and 
civilian casualties within the country over the duration of the conflict from the years the 
conflict took place. Data was taken from UCDP/PRIO's Battle Death Dataset (Lacina and 
Gleditsch 2005) to construct measures for a yearly average. Within their dataset, Lacina and 
Gleditch describe a low, high, and best estimate. For observation years for which it was 
available, the "best" estimate was used, for observation years in which it was not, the high 
estimate was used as the high estimate correlated most strongly with the best estimate for 
observations for which all three measures were available. This measure of casualties is also 
used as a control variable in the duration analysis.   
4. Control Variables 
 Having the strongest theoretical influence on a state's ability to fight conflicts as well 
as where and to what extent they are able to project control, State Power provides an 
indicator for the incumbent’s military and economic power. A measure of the incumbent’s 
strength was taken from the Correlates of War's Composite Index of Material Capabilities 
dataset. This coincides with Merom's (2003) claim that stronger, more powerful states have 
more effective means of administering violence on a large scale. The measure is taken for the 
year prior to conflict onset and logged. 
 Similarly, because Mechanization, defined in Lyall and Wilson III (2009), separates 
the military personnel administering violence from the non-combatant population, Lyall's 
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theory suggests more mechanized forces will engage in longer conflicts with a greater degree 
of indiscriminate violence. This measures an incumbent's soldier-to-mechanized-vehicle 
ratio. These ratios are lagged for the year prior to conflict onset and collapsed into quartiles 
with the highest value, 4, representing the highest level of mechanization, and 1 representing 
the lowest.  The presence of Minority Groups may also influence how states apply violence 
particularly if they are highly concentrated rather than dispersed among other groups. A 
higher concentration of a minority population might allow incumbents to administer 
indiscriminate violence against identity-based rebel groups with minimal cost absorption and 
also coincide with stronger resolve. The measure of highly concentrated minority groups 
based on the Minorities at Risk (2009) dataset indicates the presence and number of groups 
identified as being concentrated in one region within a county in which a conflict occurs. The 
level of Urbanization within the territory where the conflict is fought can influence a state's 
ability to project control over a population or a larger share of the population outside of urban 
areas might results in greater alienation from the central government, increasing resolve. 
Similarly of the finding of Schutte (2011) that a large percentage of the population living far 
away from the capital is associated with higher casualties, a large percentage living outside 
urban areas might similarly allow the state to inflict a high number of casualties by focusing 
their efforts outside the cities. To measure urbanization, the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas was calculated from the Correlates of War dataset one year prior to 
conflict onset.   
 While conventional wisdom suggests terrain roughness provides a sanctuary for 
insurgents engaging in guerilla warfare, this does not rule out the potential for other types of 
sanctuaries such as those beyond the borders of neighboring states. Cross-border Sanctuary, 
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taken from Lyall and Wilson III (2009), indicates whether the insurgents had access to refuge 
in a neighboring state. The territory throughout which the incumbent must project control can 
influence both the incumbent's ability to fight and the rebel's ability to evade the incumbent, 
potentially prolonging the conflict. Area includes all contiguous territory over which the 
incumbent attempts to control during the conflict. This variable, logged, was taken from the 
CIA World Factbook 2013 and was only be included in the duration analysis. To ensure 
temporal trends in conflict don't heavily influence the Start Year was included as a control 
variable. It was measured as the number of years after 1945.  
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Chapter VI: Results 
 In separating remote conflicts from those in which some or all of the fighting 
occurred in and around the capital, I tested a new theory, outlined in chapter three, intended 
to explain the counterintuitive results in Buhaug et al. (2005, 2009) and offer new insight into 
why terrain roughness is associated with conflict in some studies but not others. Using Cox 
Proportional-hazards Modeling, Coarsened Exact Matching and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) modeling, I tested the theory that states are more willing to administer 
higher levels of violence in remote regions and, in doing so, they prolong conflicts. 
 Because previous literature suggests that stronger states are more likely to face 
remote conflicts and stronger states may have more effective means of administering 
violence, there are multiple theoretical reasons to believe remote conflicts might be more 
violent. Similarly, the same power that influences a state's ability to inflict casualties might 
also influence, directly or indirectly, the will to fight. Matching as a pre-process allows one 
to test a hypothesis without mistaking casual inference due to correlation between selection 
for treatment and the dependent variable. There is reason to believe the treatment, in this 
case, separation, correlates with the dependent variable, the level of casualties. In other 
words a disproportionate number of cases of separated conflict will have more powerful 
states fighting as the incumbents and conflicts in which some or all of the fighting occurs in 
the capital included a greater number of weaker states. For this reason merely looking at the 
summary statistics or running regressions of the current dataset does not provide an 
appropriate counterfactual to compare separated and non-separated conflicts. The use of 
Coarsened Exact Matching pruned the dataset of extreme outliers so only comparable data 
within a common "support space" remains. Using the CEM software package algorithm to 
group conflicts into strata based on a pre-treatment covariate, in this case, state power, and 
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eliminating any strata without a treated and untreated observation, two comparable sets of 
observations remain.   
FIGURE 6.1.   Separated conflicts (1) v. Capital-adjacent Conflicts (0) Prior to 
Matching
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FIGURE 6.2.   Separated Conflicts (1) v. Capital-adjacent Conflicts (0) After Removal 
of Outliers 
 
in this case, state power, and eliminating any strata without a treated and untreated 
observation, two comparable sets of observations remain.   
 From the summary statistics there is very limited support for the core hypotheses. 
Separated conflicts appear to be both shorter and less violent than conflicts adjacent to the 
capital, both before and after matching. However, several of the theoretical assumptions are 
supported. Separated conflicts tend to occur in larger, more powerful states in which the 
incumbent is more able to keep rebellions contained to remove regions. Interestingly, the 
mean country-level measure of terrain roughness is approximately equal for each type of 
conflict.  Consistent with conventional wisdom, remote conflicts appear occur in areas more 
mountainous than the rest of the territory (though only marginally so for capital-adjacent 
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conflicts), suggesting rebellions are more feasible in rough terrain or rebels seek out rough 
terrain for its advantages in offering refuge.    
 
TABLE 6.1.   Summary Statistics 
  
Pre-match 
 
  
Full 
Dataset  
Separated 
 
Capital 
Adjacent 
Duration (weeks) 
 
453.592 
 
398.600 
 
482.588 
Battle Deaths/Year 
 
7,756.523 
 
5,760.720 
 
8,754.424 
Country-level Terrain 
Roughness 
 
0.899 
 
0.893 
 
0.880 
Conflict-zone-level 
Terrain Roughness 
 
1.100 
 
1.384 
 
0.948 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
 
3.815 
 
11.446 
 
0.000 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
(Alt) 
 
- 
 
0.344 
 
- 
Distance 
 
222.983 
 
666.950 
 
1.000 
State Power 
 
0.013 
 
0.028 
 
0.005 
Mechanization 
 
2.500 
 
2.575 
 
2.462 
Urbanization 
 
0.175 
 
0.217 
 
0.154 
Minority Groups 
 
2.642 
 
4.675 
 
1.625 
Cross-border 
Sanctuary 
 
0.342 
 
0.275 
 
0.375 
Area 
 
2,257,882 
 
5,050,701 
 
861,473 
Start Year 
 
1978 
 
1977 
 
1978 
 
 
n=120  n=40  n=80 
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TABLE 6.1 (cont.).   Summary Statistics 
 
  
Post-match 
 
  
Full 
Dataset  
Separated 
 
Capital 
Adjacent 
Duration (weeks) 
 
455.697 
 
373.733 
 
486.823 
Battle Deaths/Year 
 
7,778.007 
 
5,203.852 
 
8,755.535 
Country-level Terrain 
Roughness 
 
0.886 
 
0.901 
 
0.880 
Conflict-zone-level 
Terrain Roughness 
 
1.021 
 
1.215 
 
0.948 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
 
3.124 
 
11.349 
 
0.000 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
(Alt) 
 
- 
 
0.294 
 
- 
Distance 
 
139.458 
 
504.100 
 
1.000 
State Power 
 
0.005 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
Mechanization 
 
2.514 
 
2.600 
 
2.481 
Urbanization 
 
0.173 
 
0.220 
 
0.155 
Minority Groups 
 
1.945 
 
2.767 
 
1.633 
Cross-border 
Sanctuary 
 
0.358 
 
0.300 
 
0.379 
Area 
 
872,898 
 
1,194,269 
 
750,859 
Start Year 
 
1978 
 
1978 
 
1978 
  
n=109  n=30  n=79 
  
 After matching to create comparable groups of separated and capital-adjacent 
conflicts based on power, the average of the state power measure for separated conflicts 
decreases to a third of its original value and is yet still more than twice as high as the value 
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for conflicts adjacent to the capital.   
TABLE 6.2.   Conflicts Removed from Dataset After Matching 
1 Forest Brothers (Estonia); 
LTS(p)A, LNJS, and 
LNPA (Latvia); BDPS 
(Lithuania) 
2 USSR v. UPA in Ukraine 
3 China v. Taiwanese 
Insurgents (White Terror) 
4 Sino-Tibetan 
5 Mizo Revolt(Assam) 
6 India v. Naxalite I 
7 Afghanistan II 1980-1989 
8 India-Sikh Insurgency 
9 Russo-Chechen I 
10 India v Kashmiri 
11 Russo-Chechen II 
 
 The cases pruned from the dataset for having no corresponding treated or untreated 
cases within the strata follow a clear pattern. Only those in which the Soviet Union/Russia, 
India, and China fought against insurgency campaigns were "strong state" outliers. The 
comparison table suggests that the removal of these cases influenced the data in other ways 
as well. The mean duration for separated conflict decreased by approximately 25 weeks. The 
mean of average annual battle deaths also decreased suggesting that in addition to power 
corresponding with remote conflicts, it also corresponds with a larger number of battle 
deaths. The decrease in number of minority groups can easily be tied to the removal of 
several conflicts in India which has a disproportionately large number of minority groups. 
The level of urbanization for separated conflicts increased as did the availability of a cross-
border sanctuary among both separated and capital adjacent conflicts.  The mean area of 
continuous territory the incumbent attempts to control decreased substantially, though this is 
unsurprising given the incumbents of the conflicts pruned from the dataset.    
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1. Duration 
 Duration modeling measures the relationship between conflict length and variables of 
interest rather than predict duration.  The hazard ratios, presented in table 3, measure the 
impact of the covariate on the likelihood the conflict will terminate relative to the baseline 
hazard function (how long a conflict would last if all covariates were set to zero.  A hazard 
ratio greater than 1 suggests a greater likelihood of conflict terminating, in other words, 
shorter conflicts, while a hazard ratio less than 1 indicates that increasing the value of the 
covariate will increase the duration of the conflict.  Because the baseline is "absorbed" into 
the hazard function, there is no intercept value.   
FIGURE 6.3.   Survival Time of Matched Conflicts 
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TABLE 6.3.   Duration Analysis 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 Country-level Terrain 
Roughness 
 
.8245 
(.1246) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Conflict-zone-level 
Terrain Roughness 
 
- 
 .9683 
(.1217) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
 
- 
 
- 
 1.0461 
(.0232) 
** 
- 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
(Alt) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
.2681 
(.2201) 
 
Distance 
 
1.0958 
(.0493) 
** 1.0936 
(.0489) 
** 
- 
 .8318 
(.2921) 
 
Mechanization 
 
1.0555 
(.1306) 
 1.0797 
(.1372) 
 1.0789 
(.1254) 
 .8656 
(.2636) 
 
Urbanization 
 
2.9104 
(2.4319) 
 3.2029 
(2.6770) 
 2.0480 
(1.7099) 
 .2495 
(.5295) 
 
Minority Groups 
 
1.0329 
(.0847) 
 1.0170 
(.0825) 
 1.0269 
(.0391) 
 .8309 
(.1305) 
 
Cross-border 
Sanctuary 
 
.5506 
(.1349) 
** .5719 
(.1402) 
** .5349 
(.1224) 
*** .8620 
(.5088) 
 
State Power 
 
.7016 
(.0812) 
*** .6975 
(.0809) 
*** .7024 
(.0819) 
*** 1.1349 
(.3212) 
 
Area 
 
1.0048 
(.1011) 
 1.0084 
(.1029) 
 1.0093 
(.1032) 
 1.7798 
(.6872) 
 
Battle Deaths/Year 
 
1.2298 
(.0894) 
*** 1.2193 
(.0919) 
*** 1.1926 
(.0895) 
** 1.3577 
(.2809) 
 
Start Year 
 
1.0117 
(.0114) 
 1.0092 
(.0116) 
 1.0094 
(.0112) 
 1.0556 
(.0256) 
** 
  
n=109 
 
n=109 
 
n=109 
 
n=30 
 * p<.10  
** p <.05 
*** p <.01 
standard errors in parentheses 
  
 The Cox regression was run for each of the three measures of terrain roughness as 
well as for the alternative measure of separation. Terrain roughness reached significance only 
in the third model, in which it suggests separation increases the likelihood of conflict 
termination. In the first two models, country-level terrain roughness and conflict zone terrain 
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roughness both correspond with longer conflicts though fail to reach statistical significance. 
The distance of the conflict zone from the capital significantly predicts shorter conflicts in 
both models one and two.  Though this is consistent with the result in model three, in which 
distance is omitted to avoid multicollinearity since the separation zone roughness could also 
be described as a two-dimensional distance gradient. These results are inconsistent with 
Buhaug, et al. (2005, 2009) who suggest country-level terrain roughness corresponds with 
longer conflicts, which in this study fails to reach significance. Perhaps more interesting is 
that Buhaug et al.'s conclusion that distance of the conflict zone from the capital is strongly 
associated with longer conflicts (412, 2005), while in this study the distance from the conflict 
zone to the capital is associated with shorter conflicts, significant at p<.05. 
Counterintuitively, mechanization and the number of concentrated minority groups appear to 
be associated with shorter conflicts, though only slightly so and failing to reach statistical 
significance. Urbanization, likewise, appears to be associated with shorter conflicts, though 
failing to reach significance. The size of the territory in which the conflict was fought fails to 
reach statistical significance but the hazard remains close to 1.  The hazard ratio for the start 
year also remains close to 1 and only State power is significantly associated with longer 
conflicts at p<.01, this relationship remained significant when the models are run on the pre-
matched dataset (not shown) which included the most powerful outliers though the hazard 
ratios were slightly closer to 1.  While from the model it appears that terrain roughness offers 
little advantage as a place of refuge, the presence of a cross-border sanctuary does 
significantly increase the duration of conflict. This relationship becomes even stronger (with 
hazard ratios closer to zero and lower standard errors) in each model for the pre-matched data 
(not show). The average annual battle death rate is strongly and significantly associated with 
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shorter conflicts which is consistent with the notion of cost sensitivity among both rebels and 
incumbents. In the fourth model, which measures the effect of separation-zone terrain 
roughness among only conflicts separated from the capital. Only start year reaches statistical 
significance with a hazard ratio that remains close to 1. These results are unsurprising, given 
that only 40 of the conflicts occurred entirely outside of the capital, ten of which were pruned 
from the dataset during the matching process. 
2. Casualties 
 Because of the possibility that duration and casualties are jointly determined, in 
which longer conflicts can lead to an escalation or de-escalation of violence and, at the same 
time, an escalation of violence or de-escalation of violence could prolong conflict, or in other 
ways potentially related, I employ Seemingly Unrelated Regression models to measure the 
effects of separation on casualties.  Though they could be included as censored cases for the 
duration analysis, all conflicts continuing as of January 1, 2006, in other words exceeding the 
period of observation for the Correlates of Insurgency dataset, were dropped for this phase of 
the analysis. 
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TABLE 6.4.    SUR Analysis to Test the Effects on Casualties 
   
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Duration (Weeks) 
         
 
Country-level Terrain 
Roughness 
 
13.0045 
(55.0326) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict-zone-level 
Terrain Roughness 
 
 
 -32.6315 
(39.3491) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness+ 
 
 
 
 
 -12.6008 
(9.1486) 
 
 
 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
(Alt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150.2144 
(209.9177) 
 
 
Distance+ 
 
-21.0615 
(18.6477) 
 -21.0500 
(18.5288) 
 
 
 174.8037 
(86.8244) 
 
 
Mechanization 
 
-19.6202 
(47.7442) 
 -21.6753 
(47.6503) 
 -19.8974 
(47.5766) 
 -97.9839 
(83.6736) 
 
 
Urbanization 
 
-84.3158 
(345.3548) 
 -136.6446 
(338.6209) 
 -53.8762 
(339.879) 
 694.5061 
(588.5206) 
 
 
Minority Groups 
 
.5868 
(33.4491) 
 4.5889 
(32.9948) 
 2.5395 
(32.5308) 
 28.2741 
(44.0931) 
 
 
Cross-border Sanctuary++ 
281.019 
(100.7385) 
*** 274.3134 
(100.345) 
*** 278.4435 
(100.2242) 
*** 43.7151 
(179.7305) 
 
 
State Power+ 
 
90.6278 
(42.4600) 
** 97.2484 
(42.1742) 
** 94.2311 
(41.8294) 
** 33.1044 
(76.9056) 
 
 
Area+ 
 
-4.8891 
(37.5513) 
 -8.4893 
(37.5099) 
 -9.6639 
(37.3816) 
 -342.542 
(111.8892) 
*** 
 
Start Year 
 
-5.5273 
(3.8886) 
 -5.6091 
(3.8726) 
 -5.6025 
(3.8706) 
 -19.5692 
(7.3890) 
*** 
 
Constant 
 
1244.212 
(695.3853) 
* 1389.141 
(690.6032) 
** 1343.286 
(682.1448) 
** 4774.289 
(1563.24) 
*** 
 
 RMSE 422.3321 
 
420.9965 
 
421.249 
 
329.8655 
 
 
 "r^2" 0.1683 
 
0.1736 
 
0.1726 
 
0.3855 
 
 
 chi^2 19.65 
 
20.42 
 
20.31 
 
17.2 
 
 
 p 0.0202 
 
0.0155 
 
0.0092 
 
0.0457 
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TABLE 6.4 (cont.). SUR Analysis to Test the Effects on Casualties  
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Casualties (average annual battle deaths+)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country-level Terrain 
Roughness 
 
.3995 
(.2009) 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict-zone-level 
Terrain Roughness 
 
 
 .3156 
(.1441) 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness+ 
 
 
 
 
 -.0329 
(.0346) 
 
 
 
 
Separation-zone 
Terrain Roughness 
(Alt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4318 
(.6688) 
** 
 
Distance+ 
 
-.1022 
(.0682) 
 -.1172 
(.0676) 
* 
 
 -.4693 
(.2031) 
** 
 
Mechanization 
 
.4565 
(.1750) 
*** .4706 
(.1745) 
*** .4624 
(.1801) 
*** .6742 
(.2510) 
*** 
 
Urbanization 
 
-.0126 
(1.2562) 
 -.2135 
(1.2327) 
 -.4303 
(1.2786) 
 3.6337 
(1.6738) 
** 
 
Minority Groups 
 
-.0643 
(.1222) 
 -.0485 
(.1205) 
 -.0547 
(.1227) 
 .1164 
(.1398) 
 
 
Cross-border Sanctuary++ 
.1411 
(.3621) 
 .1273 
(.3598) 
 .0712 
(.3712) 
 .3408 
(.5462) 
 
 
State Power+ 
 
.1361 
(.1372) 
 .1351 
(.1365) 
 .1519 
(.1397) 
 .0196 
(.2436) 
 
 
Start Year 
 
-.0308 
(.0140) 
** -.0277 
(.0138) 
** -.0287 
(.0143) 
** -.0591 
(.0201) 
*** 
 
Constant 
 
8.1247 
(1.0866) 
*** 8.0419 
(1.0855) 
*** 8.5178 
(1.0747) 
*** 8.5222 
(2.4641) 
*** 
   
n=97 
 
n=97 
 
n=97 
 
n=28 
 
 
* p<.10 RMSE 1.5497 
 
1.5432 
 
1.5958 
 
1.0506 
 
 
** p<.05 "r^2" 0.1549 
 
0.1619 
 
0.1039 
 
0.6459 
 
 
*** p<.01 chi^2 17.78 
 
18.74 
 
11.24 
 
51.07 
 
 
+ logged variable p  0.0229 
 
0.0163 
 
0.1283 
 
0 
 
 
++ dichotomous 
variable 
         
          
 
standard errors in 
parentheses 
         
           
 The duration portion of the analysis is largely consistent with the Cox Proportional-
hazard models in the previous section despite the change from a non-parametric model to a 
linear model and the omission of right-censored cases. State power and the availability of a 
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cross-border sanctuary continue to be significantly associated with longer conflicts, while 
each of the terrain roughness variables fail to reach significance.   
 The analysis on casualties differed surprisingly from the duration analysis. Both 
country-level and conflict-zone-level terrain roughness are significantly associated with a 
larger number of casualties. The separation-zone roughness measure fails to reach 
significance, though is associated with a lower number of casualties. Similarly, distance from 
the capital is associated with a lower number of casualties, reaching significance in model 6 
and model 8 (which contains only conflicts which took place outside of the capital). 
However, in model 8 the average value of roughness in separation zone is significantly 
associated with higher casualties. This suggests terrain, unrelated to distance has some effect 
on the state's application of violence. The strongest predictor of casualties, reaching 
significance at p<.01 in all four models, is Lyall's measure of mechanization. Start year 
weakly and significantly predicts a lower number of casualties suggesting a temporal trend of 
insurgency wars becoming less violent. The level of urbanization reached statistical 
significance as a predictor of higher casualties in model 8 suggesting that this particular 
conflict type, conflicts fought away from the capital, may have different dynamics than those 
in which the fighting takes place in or near the capital. It is worth examining each conflict 
type separately to see if covariates have different effects on each type.    
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TABLE 6.5.  Comparing Conflict Types with SUR Analysis 
   
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
 Duration (Weeks) 
 
Capital-adjacent Separated 
 
 
Conflict Zone Terrain 
Roughness 
-31.8030 
(53.7341) 
 -33.2378 
(58.1457) 
 
Mechanization 
 
-21.2848 
(56.6270) 
 -72.3737 
(88.8081) 
 
 
Urbanization 
 
145.4025 
(449.0899) 
 -121.7918 
(543.0045) 
 
 
Minority Groups 
 
11.3242 
(58.9149) 
 13.0564 
(43.3373) 
 
 
Cross-border Sanctuary++ 252.8437 
(127.0513) 
** 239.2111 
(173.4365) 
 
 
State Power+ 
 
98.9465 
(52.0654) 
* 121.7345 
(78.0702) 
 
 
Area+ 
 
6.8784 
(43.6761) 
 -191.4812 
(87.3334) 
** 
 
Start Year 
 
-4.3492 
(4.5802) 
 -18.1052 
(7.9797) 
** 
 
Constant 
 
1124.617 
(809.003) 
 4342.768 
(1623.443) 
*** 
 
 
RMSE 427.8123  361.0472  
 
 
"r^2" 0.1987  0.2639  
 
 
chi^2 17.11  10.9  
 
 
p 0.029  0.2074  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
TABLE 6.5 (cont.). Comparing Conflict Types with SUR Analysis 
 
 
 
Model 9  Model 10  
Casualties (average annual battle deaths+)  
 
 
 
Conflict Zone 
Terrain 
Roughness 
 
.2110   
(.1870) 
 
.4782 
(.1667) 
 
 
Mechanization 
 
.2980 
(.1962) 
 .6198 
(.2468) 
** 
 
Urbanization 
 
-4.5876 
(1.5579) 
*** 5.0504 
(1.5602) 
** 
 
Minority Groups 
 
-.0489 
(.1702) 
 .0195 
(.1230) 
 
 
Cross-border Sanctuary++ .1979 
(.4290) 
 -.2138 
(.5000) 
 
 
State Power+ 
 
.1673 
(.1538) 
 -.1332 
(.2064) 
 
 
Start Year 
 
-.0145 
(.0158) 
 -.0447 
(.0189) 
** 
 
Constant 
 
8.9611 
(1.1797) 
*** 4.7137 
(1.6752) 
*** 
   
n=69 
 
n=28 
 
 
* p<.10 RMSE 1.49 
 
1.0422 
 
 
** p<.05 "r^2" 0.1824 
 
0.6515 
 
 
*** p<.01 chi^2 15.39 
 
52.34 
 
 
+ logged variable p  0.0313 
 
0 
 
 
++ dichotomous 
variable      
      
 
standard errors in 
parentheses      
       
 From models 9 and 10, one can see clear differences in the variables that correlate 
with both duration and casualties suggesting that mere location does not capture the 
difference between each type of conflict. It appears that rough terrain within the conflict zone 
is strongly associated with higher casualties only for separated conflicts. The same 
regressions were run with country-level terrain roughness (not shown), however it failed to 
reach statistical significance in either model, while the rest of the covariates performed 
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similarly. Urbanization significantly predicts a lower number of casualties in conflicts in 
which fighting occurs in and around the capital, while predicting a higher number of 
casualties in conflicts fought away from the capital. While mechanization continues to be 
associated with a higher number of casualties for each conflict type, it only reaches statistical 
significance for remote conflicts. Similarly, start year only remains a significant predictor of 
lower casualties among remote conflicts.   
 The duration analysis offers similar discrepancies. State power and the availability of 
cross-border only reach statistical significance for capital-adjacent conflicts, though the 
coefficients displayed the expected signs for separated conflicts. Similarly, area becomes a 
strong and significant predictor of shorter conflicts among those fought away from the 
capital, as does the start year.   
 The next chapter will examine these results in greater depth with respect to the core 
hypothesis and underlying assumptions about conflict and its corroboration with and 
challenges to existing literature within political science. It will also discuss limitations that 
may have impacted the results and the ability to draw conclusions from them.  Finally, it will 
discuss avenues for further research. 
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Chapter VII: Discussion 
 From the results of the quantitative analysis, several of the variables reached 
statistical significance and provide insight on conflict duration and states' willingness to 
apply violence as well as providing new direction for future conflict research. However, 
before discussing the results and their implications for the hypotheses, the limitations of this 
study must be acknowledged. Like other methods within political science, cross-national 
quantitative studies can provide only a limited portrait of the forces that influence conflict. In 
this instance both the available data and methodology may have biased the results.   
1. Limitations with Casualty Data 
 A cursory examination of the dataset assembled by (Lacina and Gleditch 2005) 
demonstrates the level of difficulty in compiling battle death statistics cross-nationally. The 
variance between the high and low estimates were often considerable and in some instances 
set at threshold levels for other datasets. For example, a conflict included in Lacina and 
Gleditch (2005) but not, for example, in Fearon and Laitin (2003) may have a high estimate 
of 999 on the assumption that it was excluded from Fearon and Laitin for failure to reach the 
casualty threshold of 1000 battle deaths per year. Because they assembled casualty data from 
multiple sources, they risk several potential reporting biases. Some researchers documenting 
the number of battle deaths in conflict may use different qualifications for what constitutes a 
battle death or may have varying abilities or inclinations to distinguish between true conflict-
related deaths and other instances of violence. Similarly casualty estimates obtained from 
personal accounts may under- or overestimate, while estimates obtained from government or 
non-government organizations may suffer inaccuracies due to vested interests in understating 
or overstating the severity of the violence to encourage or discourage intervention, to 
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demonize one side of the conflict to a global audience, or to better preserve the appearance of 
their own innocence.   
 The timing of the research relative to the timing of the conflict may have also 
impacted collection abilities.  Estimating casualties in more recent conflicts allows 
researchers to draw upon multiple sources including newer technologies that allow for better 
communication and documentation, though Start Year may control for these variations.   
 The larger potential issue with using battle death data from Lacina and Gleditch 
(2005) is the aggregation of deaths at the hands of the government and deaths at the hands of 
the insurgents. The compilation of disaggregated casualty data would subject the similar 
constraints as the collection of total casualty data. Without distinguishing between whether 
the government or the rebels inflicted the casualties, this study risks the results being heavily 
influenced by conflicts in which one ethnic group massacred another, potentially inflicted a 
large number of casualties while the government may have exercised restraint in its attempt 
to control the fighting.   
 Similarly, the study is predicated on the assumption that a higher level of casualties 
corresponds to a higher level of indiscriminate violence, which may not always be the case. 
As Kaylvas (2006) describes, indiscriminate violence is difficult to measure cross-nationally 
and the approach is not always clear from mere casualty statistics (48-49).   
2. Limitations with Geography Data  
 While the conflict zone size and location data in PRIO's Armed Conflict Data Set 
provide a better indication of where the conflicts took place than assuming the fighting took 
place throughout the country (as many cross-national studies that included geography 
variables do), it fails to capture the concentration of the fight as well as failing to account for 
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spatial-temporal variation. Because of the way the data is reported, in terms of a center point 
and radius, it is unclear if the fighting occurred equally throughout the circular area or if the 
circular area was enlarged to accommodate an isolated confrontation or attack outside of the 
regular conflict zone.  The conflict zones also say nothing of potential variations in 
battlefields or conflict dynamics.  For example while rebels may be engaging in guerrilla 
warfare in a remote region, the conflict may look quite different in urban areas, involving 
acts of terrorism or assassination attempts. Similarly, a conflict zone may have been drawn to 
include several urban areas in which the conflict was fought, or may have only occurred in 
remote regions but included relatively calm urban areas as a mere by product of using a 
center point and radius to identify the conflict zone.  As Kalyvas (2006) mentions, a common 
misconception of civil war is that fighting occurs in all areas all the time rather (117-118). 
Similarly, larger conflict zones may be endogenous to longer conflicts, in other words, all 
other things being equal, all conflicts may eventually spread to the capital if they last long 
enough.   
 In addition, because the geographic designation of "conflict zone" does not always 
imply the same level of fighting across observations, the casualty numbers become more 
difficult to normalize for population size. In other words, while a per capita measure of 
casualties might be more appropriate, examining casualty data as portion of the total 
population may skew the results for large countries fighting conflicts in remote regions. 
Similarly, attempting to normalize casualties for conflict zone size suffers from the same 
potential problem. The inability to account for spatial-temporal variation limits the 
explanatory power of a measure of casualties per geographic unit such as casualties per 100 
sq km. For example, some conflicts may begin in remote regions and remain isolated for 
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several years before expanding to a larger conflict zone or the whole country. In which case 
it would appear from the spatial data that the conflict was fought over a very large area for its 
full duration.   
3. Limitations with Methodology 
 Methodologically, Cox Proportional-hazard Models allow for testing whether the 
presence of a covariate makes it more or less likely that a conflict will terminate at time, t, 
than if the covariate were not present. However, the absence of observations in which 
conflict did not occur may introduce bias when testing the effects of terrain roughness. 
Because some conflicts may be predicated on the existence of rough terrain, including 
observations in which conflict did not occur would reduce this bias assuming in at least some 
cases, it did not occur as a result of the absence of the independent variable. Other studies 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) utilize logistical regression to account for these unobserved 
conflicts when exploring the determinates of conflict onset. Such an approach bears some 
similarity to Cox Proportional-hazards Model and other event-timing models in terms of 
determining which covariates correlate to an event occurring after periods in which the event 
(in the former, conflict onset, and in the later, conflict termination) did not occur. However, 
logistical regression does not account for censored observations, in this case, conflicts 
continuing beyond the period of observation, so using that approach for this analysis may 
have simply traded one potential bias for another. An alternative approach would be to use 
some form of truncation in which both non-conflict observations and censored cases could be 
accounted for.   
 While Coarsened Exact Matching allowed the dataset to be pruned of outliers that 
might disproportionately influence the results, the CEM software package developed by 
61 
 
(King et al. 2009) could not be fully utilized. After grouping the data into strata based on a 
specified covariate (in this case power), the program assigns weights to each observations 
according to the number of treated (in this case, separated) and control (capital-adjacent 
conflict) cases within its strata to create equally weighted treated and control groups.  
Observations within a strata that contained only treated or only control cases were given a 
weight of zero. Unfortunately the Stata commands that run Cox Proportional-hazard Models 
and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models do not allow for the weighting of observations.  
To accommodate this limitation, all observations with a CEM weight of zero were dropped.  
While this limitation of not fully utilizing the functionality of the CEM software packages 
may have preserved some of the bias that this method is intended to reduce, its function of 
pruning the dataset of outliers offered more comparable groups than existed prior to 
matching.   
 Another limitation, which the use of Coursened Exact Matching exacerbated, was the 
number of observations.  Although regression analysis for a dataset with 120 observations 
does not necessarily pose an issue, a limited number of casualties separated from the capital 
40, reduced to 30 after dropping powerful outliers and further reduced to 28 once censored 
cases are dropped for the SUR models greatly limits the potential for this data to offer 
significant results.   
4. The Underlying Assumptions 
 Both the summary statistics and regression results offer support many of the 
underlying assumptions upon which the theory is based. The summary statistics suggested 
that remote conflicts in which none of the fighting takes place in the capital tend to happen in 
more powerful states. As previously mentioned, prior to matching the mean for power among 
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separated conflicts was five times higher than for capital-adjacent conflicts. Matching 
reduced this differential but only to the point where the mean of power for separated conflicts 
is twice that of capital adjacent conflicts. The assumption that a high value for State Power 
covariate correlates to both the application of treatment, Separation, and the independent 
variable appears to be true for the duration analysis. In the first three duration models, power 
was strongly associated of longer conflicts with high levels of significance. Power continues 
to be significant in the duration portion of the SUR model for each of the first three models. 
Though interestingly, power is not a significant predictor of casualties.   
 Casualties were the strongest and most significant predictor of shorter conflicts in the 
first three models. This is consistent with the notion that incumbents, rebels, and non-
combatants will behave in such a way that most effectively brings about an end to the 
violence or limits their exposure.  
5. Terrain, Separation, and Duration 
 From the first two models in the duration analysis, neither of the terrain estimates 
reaches statistical significance though each, consistent with conventional wisdom, is 
associated with longer conflicts. However, country-level roughness is, albeit with slightly 
larger standard error, associated with longer conflicts more so than conflict-zone terrain 
roughness. In the SUR models in which the casualty variable is omitted, 5 and 6, neither 
reaches significance but country-level terrain roughness continues to be associated with 
longer conflicts while conflict-zone-level terrain roughness is associated with shorter 
conflicts. This bears some semblance to Buhaug, et al. (2005, 2009) which found terrain 
roughness at the country-level significantly associated with longer conflicts while finding 
conflict level terrain roughness associated with shorter conflicts but failing to reach 
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conventional statistical significance. In other words, in this study as well as in Buhaug, et al. 
(2005, 2009) there is greater reason to believe that terrain roughness at the country-level is 
associated with longer conflicts than terrain roughness at the conflict-zone-level.   
 In attempting to engage Buhaug, et al. (2005, 2009) and explain the counterintuitive 
result, some differences in the data between the two studies should be acknowledged. First, 
while Buhaug, et al. (2005, 20009) pooled civil war observations with varying battlefield 
dynamic, this study included only cases in which insurgency was the primary battlefield 
tactic. The notion that rough terrain provides an advantage in guerrilla warfare suggests that 
restricting the data to exclude wars fought conventionally would increase the salience of 
terrain roughness. This may explain the shift in the conflict-zone roughness variable from an 
association with shorter conflicts in Buhaug, et al. (2005, 2009) to an association with longer 
conflicts in the Cox Proportional-hazards Models, albeit not reaching statistical significance 
in either case. Though the same data was used to calculate terrain roughness, the method of 
calculation differed considerably. In Buhaug, et al. (2005) the UNEP data was transformed 
from the 7-tier scale to a dichotomous 1 for mountainous and 0 for non-mountainous and 
measured as a logged percentage (407) rather than an average value for each geographic 
section (country or conflict zone). It is possible that the slight differences in results or the 
lack of effect from a more appropriate case selection may have occurred due to differing 
calculation methods. However, because this study incorporates the 7-tier scale for differing 
levels of terrain roughness, it provides a more appropriate measure. It appears that while 
refuge may be necessary to allow rebels to prolong insurgency wars, refuge may be better 
obtained through a cross-border sanctuary in a neighboring state. 
 This study sought to address this counterintuitive result by posing an alternative 
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explanation: that geographic separation between the conflict-zone and the capital by rough 
terrain would lead to greater levels of indiscriminate violence which would prolong the 
conflict. However, the duration analysis fails to support this theory. The separation-zone 
roughness variable tested in Model 3 is significantly associated with shorter conflicts. 
Consistent with this result in Models 1 and 2 is the distance between the conflict zone and 
capital reaching significance as well as being associated with shorter conflicts. These results 
differ substantially from Buhaug et al. (2009) finds distance to the capital to be the strongest 
and most significant predictor of longer conflicts.   
 For this reason, Hypothesis 1, that separation will be associated with longer conflicts, 
is not supported. These results suggest the opposite may be true; conflicts fought in remote 
regions separated by rough terrain are shorter than those fought in which some of the fighting 
takes place in the capital. One potential explanation for this would be there are fundamental 
differences in the type of conflict fought in a remote region and those fought in and around 
the capital.  It is possible the grievances of rebels fighting in remote areas are easier to 
address than the demands of rebels who attack the state in its urban stronghold. For example, 
if the conflict involves a minority group seeking greater representation, or a rural population 
seeking more equitable distribution of resources, the incumbent may find it easier to offer 
concessions than continue to fight. Similarly, conflicts in which fighting has spread to the 
capital may correspond with a desire for a complete regime change.   
6. Terrain, Separation, and Casualties 
 Both country-level and conflict-zone-level terrain roughness are significantly 
associated with a greater number of casualties independent of whether the conflict had some 
fighting occur in the capital. However, the separation-zone-level of terrain roughness is 
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associated with lower casualties but failed to reach significant. In model 8, which measures 
only variation between conflicts fought in remote regions, the average value of mountainous 
terrain in the separation zone (regardless of the size of the separation zone) is strongly and 
significantly associated with higher casualties. Interestingly, in the same model distance is 
significantly associate with lower casualties, suggesting that a shorter distance with more 
mountainous terrain leads to higher casualties while, potentially, a longer distance with less 
mountainous terrain might lead to fewer. This coincides with Scott's (2009) notion that 
separation over mountainous terrain creates more salient divisions than separation over 
longer distance of flat terrain or water. However, these results fail to support Hypothesis 2 
and it appears separation does not lead to a greater number of casualties. As previously 
mentioned a higher number of casualties may be endogenous to larger conflict zones.   
 While it is not entirely clear why a greater distance from the capital would result in 
fewer casualties, mountainous terrain appears to be associated with higher levels of 
casualties. The fact that it reaches similar levels of significance for both conflict-zone- and 
country-level terrain roughness suggests that either given that a state has mountainous terrain 
the conflict will likely occur in that terrain or that states with rough terrain carry out 
counterinsurgency campaigns in a similar manner of using indiscriminate violence. For 
example a state with a large amount of rough terrain that is difficult to police may attempt to 
rely more on technology that would allow for better reach into remote locations without 
developing and maintaining local infrastructure. We also see mechanization strongly and 
significantly correlated with a higher number of casualties in models . This is consistent with 
Lyall and Wilson III's (2009) hypothesis that mechanization will result in greater levels of 
indiscriminate violence due to the incumbents inability to distinguish between insurgent and 
66 
 
non-combatant if they have limited contact with the local population. Models 9 and 10, ran 
the SUR models separately for each conflict type also suggest that mechanization is a more 
salient predictor of casualties in separated conflicts, while the same variable failed to reach 
significance for capital-adjacent conflicts. While a greater level of rough terrain within a 
country may provide an incentive for the incumbent to develop a more mechanized force, a 
negative correlation between mechanization and mountainous terrain (-.0482) suggest this is 
not the case.  The ability to develop a military force with a large number of armored vehicles 
requires substantial resources, merely the need for a mechanized force may not be enough to 
develop one.  Alternatively, mechanization, defined by Lyall and Wilson III (2009) as the 
ratio of military personnel to military vehicles, may not capture other factors such as air 
power that may be developed to cope with having a significant amount of rough terrain to 
control and correspond to a larger number of casualties via strategies of indiscriminate 
violence such as bombings. 
 When examining whether different factors influence duration and casualties in 
separated and capital-adjacent conflicts by using SUR models, it appears there are other 
distinguishing factors beyond geography.  Though the strongest predictors of longer conflicts 
in the original models, state power and the presence of a cross-border sanctuary fail to reach 
significance for separated conflicts, though they take the expected direction.  Area and start 
year are both associated with shorter duration for separated conflicts, each of which seems 
counterintuitive.   
 Perhaps most interesting is the role of urbanization, which failed to reach statistical 
significance in any model which pooled conflict types. In capital-adjacent conflicts we see 
urbanization strongly and significantly correlated with lower casualties, while for remote 
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conflicts the same variable is strongly and significantly correlated with higher casualties. 
There are several potential explanations for this difference. The first is that urbanization may 
correspond with some other variable such as the country's stage of development which might 
influence both how they apply violence and the type and location of conflicts they are likely 
to face. The second, which falls more closely in line with the theory, is the notion of cost 
sensitivity and that a state may be less willing to apply indiscriminate violence where the 
majority of its constituents live and where it may substantially disrupt public life. 
Conversely, if the rebellion occurs in an area that is relatively sparsely populated, the 
incumbent may be less hesitant to employ tactics of indiscriminate violence. Last, which 
relates to both the first two explanations, urbanization may exacerbate identity problems in 
remote areas while diminishing them in urban areas. In other words, incumbents, where they 
have the highest concentration of resources and security infrastructure, may be better able to 
indentify insurgents in urban areas. A state with a highly dispersed population may develop 
security infrastructure to better provide it with information in rural areas, while one in which 
a greater percentage lives in urban areas may rely on technology and more mechanized forces 
to provide security to outlying areas. A relatively high correlation (.4778) between 
urbanization and mechanization suggests this could be true.   
7. Linking Casualties and Duration 
 While the proposed theory suggests that separation between the capital and conflict 
zone will lead incumbents to administer indiscriminate violence (measured in casualties) and 
in turn exacerbate grievances against the incumbent leading to longer duration, the results 
offer little support. However, the analysis does suggest a strong relationship between 
casualties in duration in terms of cost sensitivity. For this reason it is interesting, despite 
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lower casualty numbers, that separated conflicts still appear to be shorter than those fought in 
or around the capital.  Particularly since the variables associated with higher casualties in 
remote conflicts suggest use of indiscriminate violence, such as more mountainous terrain or 
a higher level of mechanization.  One possible explanation is that indiscriminate violence 
may be more effective in bringing the conflict to an end. This is consistent with an argument 
put forth by Valentino, et al. (2004), "The logic of guerrilla war has often led military and 
political leaders to conclude that the massive killing of civilian populations may be a bloody 
but effective solution to the seemingly intractable problems of guerrilla warfare" (384). 
Though the absolute number of casualties in comparison with other types of conflicts may 
appear relatively small, this measure does not capture the percentage of persons killed within 
the conflict area which may, comparatively, be much larger. The unwillingness to apply 
indiscriminate violence as may be the case in urban areas or areas in which the state absorbs 
the cost in social and economic terms might lead to an expansion of violence in its 
geographic scope in terms of the size of the area in which it occurs and its social scope in 
terms of its uses in settling personal vendettas under the guise of conflict-related violence as 
Kalyvas (2006) describes. Although the results do not directly support the theory, there is 
some indication that states may be more inclined to administer indiscriminate violence in 
remote regions to a point where cost sensitivity among all parties is salient enough to bring 
about an end to the conflict.   
8. Avenues for Further Research 
 Although the analysis supported neither hypothesis, the findings did offer strong 
support for the assumptions on which the theory is based, suggesting that perhaps the link 
between separation, casualties, and duration may not have been thoroughly explored. 
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Improved data, such as disaggregated casualty estimates that contain the number of casualties 
sustained by the incumbent and those inflicted by the incumbent might provide portrait of 
how states apply violence across different geographies. Similarly, temporal-spatial data for 
where conflicts are fought and more clearly illustrate how conflicts expand or are contained 
over time might reduce potential endogeneity problems with larger conflict zones and longer 
duration or larger conflict zones and higher casualties.   
 The Cox Proportional-hazards models clearly suggests a relationship between a 
higher number of casualties and shorter conflict duration. However, conflict duration may 
impact an incumbent's willingness to apply violence at a given time. For this reason, 
estimating duration and casualties jointly might provide more accurate results without the 
need for removing censored observations as was required for the SUR models.  
 Because of the difficulty obtaining reliable cross-national estimates of casualties and 
geography data that would account for both conflict density and spatial-temporal trends, the 
relationship between separation, casualties, and duration might better be observed through 
qualitative research. Data collection through interviews to identify whether violence was 
selective or indiscriminate might more clearly indicate whether geography and spatial 
separation really do limit whether states abilities to identify insurgents. Sub-national survey 
research might also help illustrate if or under what circumstances an increased number of 
casualties or the use of indiscriminate violence increases rebel resolve and non-combatant 
support.   
 Perhaps the clearest opportunity for further research is the role urbanization and its 
different conflict geographies. The substantial differences in direction of the urbanization 
covariate when each conflict type is examined separately suggest that either identification 
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problems, reduced cost to the incumbent or both make higher levels of casualty more likely if 
the conflict is fought away from the capital. Rather than physical terrain creating a sense of 
separation between the incumbent and those in the conflict zone, population dispersion may 
create a sort of human terrain which as more salient effects. Similarly, although Lyall and 
Wilson III's (2009) mechanization theory corresponds with decline in incumbent victories, it 
might be worth exploring what factors lead states to develop their militaries with a higher 
ratio of armored vehicles to personnel.   
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 In seeking to provide explanation for the lack of consensus among quantitative 
studies on the role of terrain roughness, this study yielded rather surprising results. While the 
theory suggested that spatial separation between the conflict zone and capital would increase 
casualties leading to longer conflicts, instead, separation led to both fewer casualties (though 
failing to reach significance) and shorter conflicts. Using an arguably better measure of 
terrain roughness with a more appropriate case selection criteria, the results suggested rough 
terrain provides a disadvantage to rebels rather than an advantage. In failing to reach 
significance in its association with longer conflicts for either the country-level or conflict-
zone-level terrain roughness, it suggests an insufficiency in offering rebels refuge as they 
attempt to engage the state in a protracted conflict. Instead it appears from the SUR analysis, 
that rough terrain is associated with higher casualties, offering partial support for the theory 
in that it appears states may be more inclined to apply indiscriminate violence in areas with 
rough terrain. These results must be interpreted with caution, in addition to methodological 
constrains, a higher number of casualties may not be indicative of indiscriminate violence.  
 The results not only failed to explain the counterintuitive result in Buhaug et al. 
(2005, 2009), but offered collaboration in suggesting that there is greater reason to believe 
that countries with mountainous terrain may have longer conflicts, despite the assertion that 
terrain most valuable if it offers refuge to rebels engaging in guerrilla warfare. The results 
also offered collaboration to previous literature. Despite Lyall and Wilson III's (2009) 
aversion to casualties as a dependent variable (72), its use does lend strong support to their 
theory that a more mechanized force will lead to greater use of indiscriminate violence, 
though with the caveat that the effects of mechanization are most salient in remote conflicts. 
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The former coincides with the findings of Schutte (2012) that a larger percentage of the 
population living far from the capital leads to higher casualties. This finding may also lend 
credence to the value of casualties as a proxy for indiscriminate violence in cross-national 
research. 
 This study also brought to light a number of methodological constraints when 
examining power, duration, and casualties for cross-national analysis. The potential for joint-
estimation of duration and casualties in future studies might better be able to illustrate the 
relationship and determine whether cost sensitivity (in terms of casualties) reduces fighting 
or whether high levels of violence beget more violence, and determine whether these trends 
vary across different geographies. 
 However, perhaps the most substantial contribution of this study is highlighting the 
significance of urbanization in how states choose to apply violence in different types of 
conflicts.  Intending to help establish the relationship between a conflict's location and how it 
was fought, the comparison of SUR analyses for each type of conflict, separated and capital-
adjacent, provided the most insight. Though it failed to emerge as significant in either phase 
of the analysis when the conflicts types were pooled, examining it for both separated and 
capital-adjacent conflicts individually offered a compelling avenue for further research. 
Furthermore, the association of urbanization with higher casualties in remote conflicts, while 
being associated with lower casualties when some of the fighting takes place in the capital 
suggests these conflict types differ in ways beyond their proximity to the capital. The 
salience of some variables among separated conflicts and others among capital-adjacent 
conflicts further illustrates this difference. Despite the increasingly common assertion that 
improvements in communication and transportation technology make distance and 
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geographic separation less significant in a modern age, it still appears that where conflicts are 
fought substantially influences how conflicts are fought. 
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